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Abstract. We study three different models in which public goods are supplied by pri-
vate contributions. In one of these models, tax-financed government subsidies to private
contributions will definitely increase the equilibrium supply of public goods. In the other
two models, small changes in tax rates and in government provision of public goods are
neutralized by offsetting changes in private contributions. We explain why it is that these
models lead to opposite conclusions and we argue on the basis of our first model that
a government that wants to use taxes and subsidies to increase total provision of public
goods will be able to do so, even with small changes in tax rates and subsidies. Indeed,
our model yields a surprisingly decisive comparative statics result (with a nice proof). If
public goods and private goods are both normal goods, then increases in the subsidy rate
necessarily increase the equilibrium supply of public goods.
Do Government Subsidies Increase the
Private Supply of Public Goods?
James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom
Peter Warr (1983) discovered the remarkable fact that in a Nash-equilibrium model of vol-
untary public goods supply, small income redistributions among contributors to a public
good are "neutralized" by changes in equilibrium private donations. Private consumption
by individuals and the supply of public goods remain exactly the same as before redistri-
bution. Warr (1982) also observed that small government contributions to a public good,
paid for by arbitrary lump sum taxes on contributors, would be offset "dollar-for-dollar"
by reductions in private contributions. The comparative statics of non-infinitesimal redis-
tributions and of economies where some contributors may make zero contributions were
examined by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). They showed that redistribution is
not, in general, neutral if the amount of income distributed away from any consumer
exceeds his voluntary contribution to the public good.
Russell Roberts (1987, 1991) suggested that if public goods are paid for by distortionary
taxes, then efficiency would be improved by a "mixed system" in which the public good
is supplied by private contributions that are (perhaps very heavily) subsidized by the gov-
ernment. While this idea seems appealing, it must somehow be reconciled with apparently
contradictory results of Douglas Bernheim (1986), and of James Andreoni (1988), each
of whom extended Warr's result to show that seemingly distortionary taxes and subsidies
may be "neutralized" by changes in private donations.
This paper examines the neutrality results found by Andreoni and by Bernheim, and
presents a new model in which increases in subsidy rates will aecessarily increase the
equilibrium supply of public goods. We show that in all of these models neutralization of
tax-subsidy schemes is limited to "small" changes in tax obligations that do not exceed
anyone's voluntary contributions in the original equilibrium. Moreover, we argue that
it is possible for governments to design "distortionary" tax-subsidy policies which can
predictably increase the equilibrium total amount of contributions to a public good.
1. Game 1-A Model Where Government Subsidies are not Neutral
Here and in subsequent sections, we follow the useful precedent set by Bernheim (1986)
and Nett and Peters (1990) of describing the economy as a multi-st age game, with distinct
stages in which government sets policy parameters, consumers choose actions, and the
government collects taxes and provides public goods.
The economy has n consumers, one private good and one pure public good. Preferences
of consumer i are represented by a utility function, Ui (g, c1), where g is the amount of public
This work was begun while the authors were both attending the Warwick Sumrner Research Workshop
in Economics in July 1991. The authors are grateful to Olive Fraser of the University of Warwick for helpful
comments.
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good provided and c; is i's private consumption. Consumer i has an initial endowment of
m2 units of private good. The public good is produced from private goods at a cost of one
unit of private good per unit of public good. The public good is supplied by voluntary
private contributions, which may be subsidized by the government. Let gi be the amount
of public good donated by consumer i. Total supply of public goods is then g = E" gi. Let
g~; = g - gi denote contributions by consumers other than i. The government subsidizes
voluntary contributions at the rate #i, where 0 < #9 < 1. Thus, if consumer i contributes
gi units of public good, he will receive a payment of /9;g from the government. The cost
of the government subsidies i paid with a system of taxes such that consumer i is taxed
for a fixed fraction si of total government outlays, where s > 0 for all i and J"'si = 1.
The government's total expenditure on subsidies is #3g, and consumer i's tax bill is si/3g.
The budget constraint of consumer i is
c, + (1 - #)g; = m - s3 /#g. (1)
with the additional constraint that gj 0.
The game has three stages. In stage 1, the government chooses the subsidy rate /#, and
tax shares si,... , s,-. In stage 2, consumers simultaneously choose their contributions gi
so as to maximize their utilities subject to the budget constraints in Equation 1. In stage
3, the government observes the vector g1,... ,g and collects taxes s/3g from each i and
pays a subsidy, /93g, to each i. 1
We study Nash equilibrium for consumers in stage 2. In equilibrium, each consumer's
choice of gi is his best response, given the total contributions g~i of others. Each i chooses
gi to maximize Ui(gi + gi, c;) subject to Equation 1 and subject to gi > 0. Notice that if
consumer i believes that his choice of gi does not change the contributions of others, then
he must believe that his choice of g2 will determine the variable g and will also determine
his tax bill s2 /3g and his subsidy payment #3gi. Equation 1 can be rearranged as follows:
ci + (1 - /3(1 - s;))g = mi + (1 - l)g~i.(2)
In equilibrium, each consumer i's choice of gj is equivalent to choosing g to maximize
Ui(g, ci) subject to Equation 2 and subject to the constraint that g g~j.
Let us define the "demand functions," Gi(p, y) and Ci(p, y), so that Gi(p, y) and Ci(p, y)
are the choices of g and c; that maximize Ui(g, ci) subject to the budget constraint cj+pg =
y. Following the standard definition of normal goods in consumer theory, we say that
private and public goods are both normal goods for consumer i if Gi(p, y) and C;(p, y) are
both strictly increasing functions of y.2
1 For the purposes of this model, the Nash outcome would be the same if stage 3 were collapsed into
stage 2, with the government and the consumers playing simultaneously. But it may be easier to think of
there being a third stage.
2 Implicit in this construction is the assumption that both functions are well-defined and single-valued.
This amounts to assuming that preferences are continuous and strictly convex.
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When public and private goods are both normal goods, we have a remarkably strong
and decisive result. Not only does a unique equilibrium exist for any given subsidy rate,
but the amount of public goods supplied is an unambiguously increasing function of the
subsidy rate.
Theorem 1. (Existence and Uniqueness.) If preferences are continuous and strictly con-
vex and if public goods and private goods are normal goods, then for any /3 such that
0 </3 < 1 and for any si,...,sa, such that 0 <si <1 for all i and such that >3si = 1,
there exists exactly one Nash equilibrium g1,... , gz.
We have tucked the proof of Theorem 1 away in the Appendix. The proof of uniqueness
in Theorem 1 is new, and we think of some interest.
Theorem 2. (Monotonicity in Subsidies.) If the assumptions of Theorems 1 hold and
if in addition, all consumers i have "smooth" indifference curves, then the larger is the
subsidy rate /3, the greater will be the amount of public goods supplied.
Readers who just want to see how the story comes out, may choose to skip the proof of
Theorem 2, but for those who plan to work in the theory of public goods supply, we think
this proof offers some useful insights. Many writers have avoided dealing with comparative
statics with corner solutions on grounds of "tractability". This proof, we hope, will help
to convince the reader that sharp and elegant comparative statics results can be found
without the assumption that equilibrium is "interior".
In order to prove Theorem 2, we establish a lemma that is a rather interesting general
proposition in consumer theory. Stated informally this result is as follows: If there are two
goods and both are normal, then if the price of one good falls and income changes in any
way whatsoever, it must be that either (a) demand increases for the good whose price falls
or (b) demand decreases for the good whose price stays constant (or possibly both).3
Lemma 2. Let all consumers i have strictly convex preferences and "smooth" indifference
curves at (g,ci). ' If both goods are normal goods and p' < p, then for any y and y',
either Gi(p', y') > Gi(p, y) or C2(p', y') < Ci(p, y).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let p' < p, and let g' = Gi(p', y'), g = Gi(p, y), c' = C;(p', y'), and c = Ci(p, y).
By the principal of revealed preference it must be that Gi(p',p'g + ci) > Gi(p, y) and
Ci(p', p'g +ci) < Ci(p, y). There are two possibilities. Either p'g+ci < y', or p'ig+c; > y'.
In the former case, it follows from normality of g that G(p', y') > Gi(p', p' g+ci) > Gi(p, y).
In the latter case it follows from normality of c2 that C2(p', y') < C2 (p', p'g + ci) < C,(p, y).
3 The lemma holds when both goods are private goods, as well as when one is public.
4~ Indifference curves are smooth at a point if there is no more than one tangent line at that point. This
rules out "kinked" indifference curve. Without smoothness, a weaker version of Lemma 2 would obtain,
where the conclusion holds with weak (but not strict) inequalities.
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Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider the Nash equilibria that correspond to two different subsidy rates, ,3 and /3',
where /3' > /3. For each i, define pi = 1 - /3(1 - si) and p' = 1 - #'(1 - s). Then p' < pi.
Let yi = mi + (1 - /3)g~j and let y' = m2 + (1 - /3')g'~. Let S be the set of consumers for
whom gi > 0.
Suppose that g' < g. If for some consumer i E S, Gi(p', y=) > G2(p, y), then g' >
Gi(p', y') > Gi(p, y) = g. Therefore if g' < g, it must be that for all i E S, Gi(p', y') K
Gi(p, y). It follows from Lemma 2, that if g' < g, then Ci(p', y') < Ci(p, y) for all i E S.
Let c' = C;(p', yi) and c2 = C;(p, y). According to the budget equation (1), for all i E S,
c; = m2 -(1-/3)g -s#/3g and c' = mi -(1-3')g- s#/3g'. Ifc' < ci for all i E S, it must be
that Fsc'; = Zs(mi - (1- /3 ')g - s/3g') < Es ci = Zs(mi -(1- /)gj - si/3g) and hence
(1-#3) Es9i+Es si9 C<(1 - ') Es g +E sis;'g'. But EiEG gi = g and EiEGgi '"
Therefore (1-/ 3+Esi)g < (l-3'+Essi)g'. Since 0 < (1-/3'+Zssi) < (1-3+ s),
it must be that g' > g. But this contradicts our initial assumption that g' < g. It follows
that g' > g. I
2. Game 2-A Game with Neutral Subsidies.
In this section we consider an alternative model, due to Andreoni (1988), in which taxes
and small government subsidies to public goods are neutralized in equilibrium. Although,
as we will see, the applicability of neutrality is limited to relatively small changes in tax
rates, it is interesting to see just how it happens that fiscal policies that seem capable of
altering the allocation of resources are neutralized in equilibrium.
Let preferences and technology be as in Game 1. As in Game 1, the government chooses
a subsidy rate /3 at which it will subsidize private contributions to public goods. But in
this game, the government's tax policy is different. In Stage 1, the government, chooses
a "head tax" 'ri to be assessed against each i and a subsidy rate /3 which will be paid on
private contributions to public goods. Thus a consumer who contributes gi units of public
goods will receive a subsidy of /3gj and will have a net tax obligation of ri - /3gi. The
government uses its net revenue, which is E,(ri - /3g), to supply additional units of the
public good.
In Stage 2 of the game, the consumer's budget equation is c2 + gi = mi - ri + /3gi or
equivalently,
ci + (1 - /3)g; = mi -Ti. (3)
The supply of public goods is the sum of individual contributions plus the government's
contribution. This gives us g = gi+ + E > r - /3>2 gj. This equation can be rewritten
as (1 -#3)g; = g - 2; 'r; -(1 -)g~;. Substituting this expression into the budget constraint
in Equation 3, we can write the budget equation in "standard form", much as we did for
Game 1 in Equation 2. This budget is
c; +9 = i + ((1- #)g - 5).(4)
ji
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For Game 2, as for Game 1, Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under quite weak
assumptions. The following is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 3. (Existence and Uniqueness.) If preferences are continuous and strictly con-
vex and if public goods and private goods are normal goods, then for any subsidy rate j3
such that 0 </3 < 1 and head taxes r1,...,r, such that Ti < mi for all i, there exists
exactly one Nash equilibrium g1, ... , g,.5
For this game it turns out that sufficiently "small" change in the subsidy rate # and
the head taxes ri will be neutralized by offsetting private actions. This happens because
each individual is able to adjust his private contributions to the tax-subsidy schedule in
such a way that no matter what the other players do, his own private consumption will be
the same as before the change.
Let c' and gi be consumer i's equilibrium levels of private consumption and public
contribution if taxes and subsidies are both zero. Then ci +g' = mi and (c7, g*) maximizes
Ui(ci, g) subject to ci + g < mi + gi. From Equation 2 it follows that with subsidy rate
#Q and tax rate ri, consumer i can maintain a consumption of ci by setting
gi = (g7 - ri)/(1 - /#). (5)
If all consumers j 0 i maintain consumption levels c by choosing g3 = (g -r)/(1-/),
then Z ((1 - /3)gj - ry) = g *, so that the budget equation (4) simplifies to ci + g =
mi + g*,;. This is precisely the budget equation faced by i when there are no taxes and
subsidies. Therefore i will choose to maintain the initial public goods supply g*, by setting
his own gift equal to gi = (gi - Ti)/(1 - /3) and keeping c2 = ci. Therefore, despite the
taxes and subsidies, there is a Nash equilibrium in which private consumptions and public
goods are the same as in the no-tax, no-subsidy equilibrium. We have proved the following.
Theorem 4. (Neutrality) In Game 2, let g*,... , g*, be the Nash equilibrium contributions
if taxes and subsidies are zero. If the government introduces taxes and subsidies uch that
Ti < gi for all i, then in the new equilibrium with taxes and subsidies, each consumer will
have the same private consumption as in the original equilibrium and the total amount of
public goods will also be unchanged.
Given the uniqueness result of Theorem 3, it follows from Theorem 4 that when taxes
and subsidies can be offset by changes in private contributions, then the only Nash equi-
librium is one in which the original consumptions are unchanged.
From Theorem 4 and its proof we can understand the exact limitations of the scope of
neutrality to "small" changes in taxes and subsidies. Equation 5 informs us that consumer
i can maintain a constant consumption after the introduction of taxes and subsidies if and
5The equilibrium could possibly be one in which the government's contribution to the supply of public
goods is negative. As a formal matter, the model still makes sense if we allow the government to run a
deficit and "pay for" its subsidy program by selling off private donations to the public good.
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only if g ;> Ti. This is the case if and only if the head tax that is introduced to pay for
the subsidies does not exceed any consumer's initial voluntary contribution.
The fact that neutrality fails for large changes in taxes and subsidies should not be
regarded as a mere technical curiosity. To appreciate this point, notice that in a large
economy, if a pure public good is supplied by voluntary contributions, the equilibrium
supply of public goods will be far short of the Pareto optimal supply. The government
could surely choose to collect taxes and to supply an amount of public goods that is close
to Pareto efficient. Of course this would change the real allocation of resources, and so
government's actions must not be neutralized. The neutrality that holds for small changes
fails as soon as tax collections from some individuals come to exceed the amount of public
goods that they would contribute voluntarily.
3. Game 3-Bernheim's Game with Neutral "Distortionary Taxes"
Bernheim (1986) presents a different model in which seemingly distortionary govern-
ment policies are neutralized in equilibrium. According to Bernheim, if "individuals care
about the magnitude of their own contributions only insofar as these contributions affect
the aggregate level of expenditures; and all individuals make positive contributions", then
(among other things) "any policy consisting of apparently 'distortionary' transfers and dis-
tortionary public finance of the privately provided public good, has no effect on resource
allocations."
In Bernheim's model, distortionary transfers take the form of taxes on labor income,
which distort the labor-leisure choice. As Bernheim acknowledges, his result depends
crucially on the way that decisions are timed. We will discuss a simplified variant of Bern-
heim's model which preserves the features essential to his argument, but in its simplicity
is more transparent than the original.
The economy has n consumers and three commodities-an ordinary consumption good,
leisure, and a pure public good. Preferences of consumer i are represented by a utility
function of the form Ui(g, ci, £i), where g is the total amount of public good provided, c,
is i's consumption of the private good and ti is i's leisure.
Person i's income depends on how much leisure he chooses, according to a function
m;(Li). From consumer i, the government collects an amount of taxes which depends on
the leisure choices, £ = (1,... ,,), according to a function, t=(t). Each unit of public
goods costs one unit of private goods and the government spends all of its tax revenue
on the public good. Therefore the amount of public good provided by the government is
go = 1 t_(P). Individuals may also make voluntary contributions toward the supply of
public good, where gj is the contribution of consumer i. Total supply of public goods is
then g = l'"g 2. Let g~j = g - g1 denote total contributions by the government and by
consumers other than i.
Following Bernheim, we model the economy as a game with four stages. In the first
stage, the government chooses tax functions, t;(e). In the second stage, consumers choose
their amounts of leisure. In the third stage, consumers choose their voluntary contributions
to the supply of public goods. In the fourth stage the government collects the voluntary
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contributions and taxes according to the functions Tt, and supplies an amount of public
goods equal to its total revenue.
Since the vector £ of leisure choices is determined in Stage 2, it must be that when Stage
3 begins, each consumer's tax bill, after-tax income, and leisure is already set. Therefore in
Stage 3, the only choice left to a consumer is the division of his after-tax income between
private consumption and contributions to the public good. This means that, Stage 3 of
this game is equivalent to Stage 2 of the game studied in the first section of this paper
where the subsidy rate /3 is zero and where m2 = m2(ei) - t;(C), for each i. Therefore
Theorems 1 and 2 establish existence and uniqueness of Stage 3 equilibrium conditional
on the outcome, £, of Stage 2.
Bernheim shows that subject to certain qualifications, if the government imposes a non-
neutral tax on labor income and uses it to finance government supply of public goods, then
in equilibrium, the government's activities will be undone by offsetting changes in consumer
actions. Stated informally, the reasoning is this. Suppose that after the government
introduces a tax, every consumer decides to take exactly as much leisure as he did when
there was no tax and also decides to reduce his voluntary contribution by the amount of
the tax. Then each consumer will be consuming the same amount of private goods as he
was before the tax was imposed. The amount of public goods supplied is the sum of private
contributions and tax revenue, so it too will be unchanged. If all other consumers choose
not to change their leisure and to reduce their donations by the amount of the tax, then
consumer i's budget constraint allows him to pursue the same strategy. Furthermore, the
set of combinations of private consumption and public goods supply that are possible for
him is contained in the combinations available to him when there is no tax. Therefore his
best choice will be the same combination of private consumption and public goods supply
that he chose when there were no taxes.
More formally, we have the following, which is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 5. In Game 3, consider a Nash equilibrium in which the government collects
no taxes and pays no subsidies, and let e* = * ,e* and g1,...,ga, be the equilibrium
vectors of work efforts and donations to the public good. If the government introduces
taxes according to a schedule ti(t), such that t,(e*) g for all i, then there exists a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for Game 3, in which each consumer enjoys the same
work effort, the same consumption, and the same amount of public goods as in the no-tax
equilibrium.
Theorem 5 would not be true without the assumption that ti(e*) < gi for all i. This
requiremrent means that the neutrality result only applies to the introduction of taxes in
such a way that nobody is assessed a tax greater than the arnount of money he had been
contributing voluntarily to the supply of public goods.
4. So What is the Answer?
In Garne 1, the government is able to change the real allocation of resources in a predictable
way. In Garnes 2 and 3, seemingly distortionary government policies have no real effect
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on equilibrium. What, then, should we conclude about whether government policies are
neutral?
In all three of the games that we modeled, if the government imposes a small lump
sum tax on a contributor and spends the proceeds on the public good, there will be no
real effect. When the government takes money from a person's pocket and gives it to the
public good, she is not "fooled". She will simply reduce her voluntary contributions by the
amount of the lum sum tax. If people are prescient enough to see through the government
veil of lump sum taxes, then we might wonder why shouldn't they also be able to see that
"distortionary taxes" are also a veil? After all, the government policy does not create any
new wealth. If people can obtain their initial no-tax demands by offsetting changes in their
contributions, won't they try to do so, even with a "distortionary" tax? The prediction of
a neutral subsidy has some appeal to our economist's sense that rational agents who are
able to see through the veil of government policy, will also be able to discard this veil.
Our first response to this question is to observe that even in those models where neu-
trality is found, the scope of neutrality is very limited. Individuals are able to unravel the
effect of a change in their tax burden only if the tax assessed against them does not exceed
the amount that they would contribute voluntarily to the public good in the absence of
taxes. The neutrality results in our Games 2 and 3, like those found by Warr, Andreoni,
and Bernheim all fail if any individual is taxed in excess of the amount he would contribute
voluntarily.
What remains to be understood is the difference that leads to "local" neutrality in
Games 2 and 3, but not in Game 1. We will examine the difference between Games 1
and 2. Similar considerations apply to the comparison of Games 1 and 3. In Game 1 the
government commits to making no direct contributions of public goods.6 The government
is assumed to balance the budget by adjusting taxes on individuals. By contrast, in Game
2 the government commits to no change in taxes, and balances the budget by adjusting its
contribution to the public good. In Game 2, each consumer has access to a strategy that
will keep his private consumption constant after small changes in government policy, no
matter what the other consumers do. Where gi is a consumer's contribution in the initial
equilibrium, he can maintain the same consumption with tax rate r and subsidy rate /,
by setting gi = (gi - ri)/(1- /3). As it happens, if all other consumers choose to neutralize
the effects of the government policy on their own consumption, then it will be optimal for
every consumer to do so.
In Game 1, if a consumer is to maintain his initial consumption as si and # change,
then he must set his contributions at gi = (gi - si/g~,i)/(1 - /3(1 - si)), where g' is i's
no-tax equilibrium contribution. In contrast to Game 2, in order to neutralize the effects
of the tax-subsidy scheme on his own consumption, each consumer must know the total
contributions g~; of others. Moreover, if each consumer believes the contributions of others
to be invariant to his own contribution, then he will not choose the same net contribution
as he would with no subsidy or taxes. It is possible to devise an extended version of
6 More generally, the same results would follow if the government committed to a modest positive
contribution-so long as the amount it contributes is independent of any choices made by individuals.
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Game 1 in such a way that an equilibrium exists in which a government tax-subsidy plan
would be neutralized. But to do this, individuals have to be offered a richer strategy space
than simply choosing an amount of contributions. The idea is to allow each individual
to announce that his own contribution will be a "function" of the total contributions
of others and to compute equilibrium as a fixed point of these functions. Specifically,
suppose that every consumer j $ i announced that his own contributions would depend
on the contributions of others according to the function gj = (g3 - syjg~,)/(1 -/3(1- s)).
Then every consumer other than i would maintain the same private consumption with
the tax-subsidy scheme as without it. Furthermore, the best thing for consumer i to do
would also be to maintain his original consumption, which he would accomplish by setting
gi = (g - si/3gi)/(1 - /3(1 - Si))
So we see that even with the tax-subsidy policy outlined in Game 1, neutrality is
possible if the game has an announcement stage and if individual strategies are expanded
to allow individuals to make their contributions functions of the contributions of others.
Does this restore the case for neutrality? We think not, for two reasons. One is a simple
technical fact. In the game in which individual strategies are allowed to include functions,
the neutral equilibrium is not the only Nash equilibrium. Another equilibrium for this
same game is an equilibrium in which each individual submits a "constant" function, in
which his contribution does not depend on the contributions of others, but only on the tax
rate and the subsidy rate. The equilibrium that we originally calculated for Game 1 is also
a Nash equilibrium for this game. These equilibria, as we have demonstrated in Theorem
2 are certain to be non-neutral with respect to the subsidy rate.
A second reason is that the government's intention in setting up a subsidy game is to
influence the total amount of contributions. It would therefore try to set up the institutions
of that game in such a way as to avoid an "announcement round" in which individuals could
respond to each others' contributions. If public goods decisions are appropriately modeled
as a one-shot game, for which the government can set up the rules, then there seems little
doubt that it could set up the rules and information structure to approximate Game 1 and
it would expect that subsidies unambiguously induce increased total contributions. But
given that the game is played repeatedly, over the years, there may be room for lingering
doubts that the insights gained from a one-shot model are the appropriate ones.
Repeated play of this game could be modelled as a "consistent conjectural variations
equilibrium"7 where consumers anticipate that eventually small changes in their contribu-
tions will be neutralized by offsetting actions of other consumers and accordingly choose
to maintain constant consumptions in equilibrium, even with the tax scheme in Game 1.
But in such a model, there will typically be many other subgame perfect Nash equilibria as
well, including the one-shot Nash equilibrium we found for Game i. 8 As far as we know,
SFor discussions of consistent conjectural variations and related issues, see Laitner (1980), Bresnahan
(1980), and Marschak and Selten (1978).
8 MacMillan (1979) showed that in a repeated game of voluntary contributions, the set of subgame
perfect equilibria is very large and contains Pareto optimal allocations. This plethora of equilibria is an
instance of the well-known general problem in the theory of repeated games known as the "Folk Theorem."
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no one has offered a model of repeated games in which neutralization of distortionary taxes
stands out as a focal equilibrium among the many possible equilibria.
We have shown that if a government tax-subsidy scheme (whether lump-sum or not)
collects more taxes from some individuals than they would have contributed voluntarily,
then the scheme will change the real allocation of resources. Moreover, we demonstrated
a simple tax-subsidy scheme that would necessarily increase the level of public goods even
if nobody's taxes exceed her initial voluntary contributions. Although it is true that tax-
subsidy schemes can be designed which will be neutralized if they collect no more from
any individual than she would contribute voluntarily, it is also the case that a government
that wants to increase the total amount of public goods can find a scheme to do so.
10
Appendix
As in the text of the paper, let the demand functions G;(p, y) and C;(p, y) be the g
and c respectively,- that maximize U;(g, ci) subject to Ci + pG; = y. The first Lemma is
useful in proving Theorems 1 and 3 on uniqueness of equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For either Game 1, or Game 2, suppose that for a given subsidy rate /9
and tax parameters, there are two Nash equilibria g1,... ,gn and g',..., g', such that
g' = g' > g=ZEgi. Then for all i, g'~; >g~ .
Proof of Lemma 1. We first prove the Lemma for Game 1. Let pi = 1 - X3(1 - si) and
let p' = 1 - /3'(1 - si). We show that g' > gi in each of the two possible cases where
g > 0 and gi = 0.
* Case (i). If gi > 0, then since g,... , g' is a Nash equilibrium, it must be that g' =
Gi(pi, mi + (1 - 3 )g' ). Since 91,... , g, is a Nash equilibrium, it must be that g >
G2(py, mi + (1 - /3)g~;). By assumption, g' > g. Therefore G;(p;,m + (1 - /)g' ;) >
Gi(pi, mi + (1 - /3)g, 2). Since the public good is assumed to be a normal good, it follows
that m2 + (1 - #6)g' ; > mi + (1 - #)gi and hence g'~ ;2 g~i.
" Case (ii). Consumer i has g' = 0. Then g~; g 5 g' = g',i so that g' g~ .
The proof of Lemma 1 for Game 2 uses the same argument except that this time we
define pi = 1 - 0 and pi = 1 - /3' and replace mi by mi - r at each point in the proof.
I
Proof of Theorem 1.
The existence of at least one Nash equilibrium is a straightforward application of
Brouwer's fixed point theorem to the function mapping a vector is of contributions gi, ... , gn
into the vector of "best responses." See, for example, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986).
Now let us consider uniqueness. Suppose that there are two distinct Nash equilibria
corresponding to a given ,3. Let gi,..., g, c1 ,...,cn, and g1,... ,g', c1,...,,c', be the
individual contributions and private consumptions in the two equilibria. Suppose, without
loss of generality that g' = Z gz > g = Z gi. Then according to Lemma 1, it must be that
for all i, g' ;i> g~i and since the two equilibria are assumed to be distinct, it must be that
g' > gi for some i and therefore g' > g. 9
Let pi = 1 - /3(1 - se). Since the private good is a normal good and g' g~, it
must be that c' = Ci(p;, mi + (1 - /)g';) > Ci(pi, mi + (1 - #)g.i) = ci for all i with
strict inequality for some i. Therefore, j; c' > j; c;. But in equilibrium, it must be that
>; c'; + g' = ;m;= E;c, + g.'0 Since >j; c'; > E; c2, it must be that g' <Kg. But this
9The result that g' > g follows from g = (Eg;/n- 1) > (E gi)/(n - 1) = g'.
10 This is just the feasibility constraint. To see that it is always holds in Nash equilibrium, one adds the
budget equations over all individuals and makes appropriate simplifications.
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contradicts our assumption that g' > g. It follows that there can not be two distinct Nash
equilibria. I
Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof Theorem 3 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The first two paragraphs
of that proof carries over unchanged. The third paragraph also applies with the following
modifications. For all i, set p2 = (1- /) and wherever mi appears in the argument, replace
it by mi - ri. U
Proof of Theorem 5.
Let ci , ei and gi, be the choices made by consumer i in the no-tax equilibrium. In Stage
3, consumer i chooses ci and gi to maximize U;(ci, g*, + gi, i) subject to the constraint
c, + gi = m (fei) and subject to g= > 0. This problem can be expressed equivalently as
choosing g and c; so as to maximize Ui(ci,,g,eti) subject to c;+g = mi(ei)+g*, and subject
to g g*.
Now let the government collects taxes according to the schedule ti(), from each i and
spend its revenue on the public good. We claim that there is an equilibrium where each
consumer reduces his voluntary contributions to exactly offset the new taxes. That is,
each consumer reduces his contribution from gi to g - ti(e*), which is non-negative by
assumption. If in Stage 2, consumers choose t*, then in Stage 3, consumer i's budget
constraint will be ci + gi = m (.e=) - t,(e*) and gi > 0. The total amount of public goods
is the sum paid for out of taxes and individual contributions. Therefore g = gi + t;(t) +
Z,;(gj + tj(t)).
If all consumers other than i contribute gj = g - tj(e*), then this last equation is
equivalent to g = g;+t 5+g*;. Therefore the budget constraint becomes ci+g = m(*)+g,
and the constraint that gi > 0 is equivalent to g > g*~ i + ti(t*). But this budget is the
same as the budget constraint in the absence of the tax. Consumer i can restore the no-tax
equilibrium by choosing c2 = cZ and gi = g= - t;(e*), in which case the total supply of
public goods is g* = E" gi, just as in the no-tax equilibrium. Not only is this a possible
choice for consumer i, it is the best affordable choice for consumer i given the actions of
the other consumers. This follows from the "principle of revealed preference" and from
the fact that the budget set available to consumer i with the taxes is contained the budget
set available in the no-tax equilibrium.
This reasoning shows that for any vector e chosen in Stage 2, the same equilibrium will
obtain with the tax as without the tax. Therefore the choices of labor supply in Stage 2
will not be altered by the tax. Given that the labor supply in Stage 2 does change, we
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